You note that the temptation to cheat creates tension between the two trading nations, but you could phrase this much more strongly: theoretically, both players SHOULD cheat. Weiss, Uri, and Joseph Agassi. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. This equilibrium depends on the payoffs, but the risk dominance condition places a bound on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. startxref Battle of the sexes (game theory) - Wikipedia However, the interest of the state has continued to overshadow the interest of the people. [46] Charles Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, International Security 19, 3(1994): 50-90. The matrix above provides one example. Table 9. 1. Finally, Table 13 outlines an example payoff structure that results in a Stag Hunt. [50] This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. Stag hunt definition and meaning | Collins English Dictionary Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . This technological shock factor leads actors to increase weapons research and development and maximize their overall arms capacity to guard against uncertainty. Using game theoretical representations of state preferences, Downs et al. Julian E. Barnes and Josh Chin, The New Arms Race in AI, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; Cecilia Kang and Alan Rappeport, The New U.S.-China Rivalry: A Technology Race, March 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/us-china-trade-technology-deals.html. As the infighting continues, the impulse to forego the elusive stag in favor of the rabbits on offer will grow stronger by the day. [16], On one hand, these developments outline a bright future. Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of both the likelihood that the actor themselves will develop a harmful AI times that harm, as well as the expected harm of their opponent developing a harmful AI. Under which four circumstances does the new norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect' arise? [27] An academic survey conducted showed that AI experts and researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years. POLS1501 Practice Flashcards | Quizlet Different social/cultural systems are prone to clash. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. There is no certainty that the stag will arrive; the hare is present. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. d About: Stag hunt They suggest that new weapons (or systems) that derive from radical technological breakthroughs can render a first strike more attractive, whereas basic arms buildups provide deterrence against a first strike. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. An example of norm enforcement provided by Axelrod (1986: 1100) is of a man hit in the face with a bottle for failing to support a lynching in the Jim Crow South. [14] IBM, Deep Blue, Icons of Progress, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/. Payoff matrix for simulated Deadlock. As such, it will be useful to consider each model using a traditional normal-form game setup as seen in Table 1. He found various theories being proposed, suggesting a level analysis problem. Here, this is expressed as P_(h|A or B) (A)h_(A or B). SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. Together, the likelihood of winning and the likelihood of lagging = 1. > For example, suppose we have a prisoner's dilemma as pictured in Figure 3. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 The remainder of this section looks at these payoffs and the variables that determine them in more detail.[53]. %PDF-1.7 % As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). Posted June 3, 2008 By Presh Talwalkar. Gray[36] defines an arms race as two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attain to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.. As will hold for the following tables, the most preferred outcome is indicated with a 4, and the least preferred outcome is indicated with a 1., Actor As preference order: DC > CC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DD > DC. The paper proceeds as follows. How can the security dilemma be mitigated and transcended? There is a substantial relationship between the stag hunt and the prisoner's dilemma. What are some good examples of coordination games? Press: 1992). Finally, in a historical survey of international negotiations, Garcia and Herz[48] propose that international actors might take preventative, multilateral action in scenarios under the commonly perceived global dimension of future potential harm (for example the ban on laser weapons or the dedication of Antarctica and outer space solely for peaceful purposes). Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. [3] Elon Musk, Twitter Post, September 4, 2017, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800. In testing the game's effectiveness, I found that students who played the game scored higher on the exam than students who did not play. As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. As a result of this, security-seeking actions such as increasing technical capacity (even if this is not explicitly offensive this is particularly relevant to wide-encompassing capacity of AI) can be perceived as threatening and met with exacerbated race dynamics. The Stag Hunt game, derived from Rousseaus story, describes the following scenario: a group of two or more people can cooperate to hunt down the more rewarding stag or go their separate ways and hunt less rewarding hares. At the same time, a growing literature has illuminated the risk that developing AI has of leading to global catastrophe[4] and further pointed out the effect that racing dynamics has on exacerbating this risk. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. In this model, each actors incentives are not fully aligned to support mutual cooperation and thus should present worry for individuals hoping to reduce the possibility of developing a harmful AI. Payoff matrix for simulated Stag Hunt. If the United States beats a quick path to the exits, the incentives for Afghan power brokers to go it alone and engage in predatory, even cannibalistic behavior, may prove irresistible. Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources Using the payoff matrix in Table 6, we can simulate scenarios for AI coordination by assigning numerical values to the payoff variables. If both sides cooperate in an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that each actor believes such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI expressed as P_(b|A) (AB)for Actor As belief and P_(b|B) (AB)for Actor B times each actors perceived benefit of AI expressed as bA and bB. Can you think of any situations of scenarios in international 714 0 obj These two concepts refer to how states will act in the international community. For example, most land disputes, like the ongoing Chinese andJapanesedisputeover the Senkaku Islands, must be resolved bycompromisingin other areas of policy in order to achieve the goal. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. The current landscape suggests that AI development is being led by two main international actors: China and the United States. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality : If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would h ave gone off in pursuit . [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks. Specifically, it is especially important to understand where preferences of vital actors overlap and how game theory considerations might affect these preferences. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. Table 1. As described in the previous section, this arms race dynamic is particularly worrisome due to the existential risks that arise from AIs development and call for appropriate measures to mitigate it. In this paper, I develop a simple theory to explain whether two international actors are likely to cooperate or compete in developing AI and analyze what variables factor into this assessment. How does the Just War Tradition position itself in relation to both Realism and Pacifism? 0000004572 00000 n (Pergamon Press: 1985). Table 11. As a result, it is conceivable that international actors might agree to certain limitations or cooperative regimes to reduce insecurity and stabilize the balance of power. In addition to boasting the worlds largest economies, China and the U.S. also lead the world in A.I. Here, values are measured in utility. But cooperation is not easy. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. [8] Elsa Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence, Lawfare, June 20, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-cfius-strategic-challenge-chinas-rise-artificial-intelligence (highlighting legislation considered that would limit Chinese investments in U.S. artificial intelligence companies and other emerging technologies considered crucial to U.S. national security interests). <> The most important role of the U.S. presence is to keep the Afghan state afloat, and while the negotiations may turn out to be a positive development, U.S. troops must remain in the near term to ensure the possibility of a credible deal. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 8. [39] D. S. Sorenson, Modeling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Stability, Journal of Peace Science 4 (1980): 16985. 0000006229 00000 n 'The "liberal democratic peace" thesis puts the nail into the coffin of Kenneth Waltz's claim that wars are principally caused by the anarchical nature of the international system.' [42] Vally Koubi, Military Technology Races, International Organization 53, 3(1999): 537565. %%EOF Photo Credit: NATO photo by Capt. [37] Samuel P. Huntington, Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results, Public Policy 8 (1958): 4186. In addition to leadership, the formation of a small but successful group is also likely to influence group dynamics. If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. 7into the two-person Stag Hunt: This is an exact version of the8 informal arguments of Hume and Hobbes. I thank my advisor, Professor Allan Dafoe, for his time, support, and introduction to this papers subject matter in his Global Politics of AI seminar. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People In recent years, artificial intelligence has grown notably in its technical capacity and in its prominence in our society. This can be facilitated, for example, by a state leader publicly and dramatically expressing understanding of danger and willingness to negotiate with other states to achieve this. Prisoner's Dilemma - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Finally, there are a plethora of other assuredly relevant factors that this theory does not account for or fully consider such as multiple iterations of game playing, degrees of perfect information, or how other diplomacy-affecting spheres (economic policy, ideology, political institutional setup, etc.) An example of the game of Stag Hunt can be illustrated by neighbours with a large hedge that forms the boundary between their properties. Indeed, this gives an indication of how important the Stag Hunt is to International Relations more generally. 0000003638 00000 n Here, values are measured in utility. [28] Armstrong et al., Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence development.. . endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream The familiar Prisoners Dilemma is a model that involves two actors who must decide whether to cooperate in an agreement or not. [20] Will Knight, Could AI Solve the Worlds Biggest Problems? MIT Technology Review, January 12, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545416/could-ai-solve-the-worlds-biggest-problems/. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. Additionally, the feedback, discussion, resource recommendations, and inspiring work of friends, colleagues, and mentors in several time zones especially Amy Fan, Carrick Flynn, Will Hunt, Jade Leung, Matthijs Maas, Peter McIntyre, Professor Nuno Monteiro, Gabe Rissman, Thomas Weng, Baobao Zhang, and Remco Zwetsloot were vital to this paper and are profoundly appreciated. Does a more optimistic/pessimistic perception of an actors own or opponents capabilities affect which game model they adopt? The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 10. This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. A day passes. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. NUMBER OF PAGES 65 14. Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People are Socially Late. Therefore, an agreement to play (c,c) conveys no information about what the players will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing." Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 1 The metaphors that populate game theory modelsimages such as prisoners . Moreover, each actor is more confident in their own capability to develop a beneficial AI than their opponents. Using Game Theory to Claim Advantage in Negotiations - Kogan Page Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. In addition to the pure strategy Nash equilibria there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. I introduce the example of the Stag Hunt Gamea short, effective, and easy-to-use activity that simulates Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy. [1] Kelly Song, Jack Ma: Artificial intelligence could set off WWIII, but humans will win, CNBC, June 21, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/21/jack-ma-artificial-intelligence-could-set-off-a-third-world-war-but-humans-will-win.html. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistan's internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. It involves a group of . 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. But who can we expect to open the Box? Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo.. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. Together, this is expressed as: One last consideration to take into account is the relationship between the probabilities of developing a harmful AI for each of these scenarios. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts : Networks Carol M. Rose argues that the stag hunt theory is useful in 'law and humanities' theory. So it seems that, while we still are motivated by own self-interest, the addition of social dynamics to the two-person Stag Hunt game leads to a tendency of most people agreeing to hunt the stag. Similar to the Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken occurs when each actors greatest preference would be to defect while their opponent cooperates. Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. For example, one prisone r may seemingly betray the other , but without losing the other's trust.
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